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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory of endogenous fluctuations, grounded on a repeated game
with strategic complementarity under incomplete information. The equilibrium is char-
acterized by a persistent regime of high activity, where aggregate output tends to expand,
followed by a persistent contractionary phase in a recurring cycle. The regime persistence
is driven by belief hysteresis, where learning in active regime fuels optimism, propelling
an expansion. After an inevitable regime switch, rational persistent pessimism ensues,
leading to a prolonged contraction. The equilibrium cycle is unique, stochastic, and
converges to a stationary distribution, which characterizes the nature of fluctuations in
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The dominant macroeconomic paradigm views aggregate fluctuations as a propagation of
exogenous aggregate shocks to fundamentals, but falls short of explaining ‘how’ business
cycles arise in the first place. A competing theory may be found in models with multiple
rational-expectations equilibria, where changes in expectations can lead to equilibrium
shift in a self-fulfilling way, laying the basis for fluctuations unrelated to exogenous
shocks.1 However, shifts in expectations still remain unexplained under this approach,
leaving multiple equilibria at best a caricature of fluctuations. Moreover, subsequent
research has found the existence of multiplicity to be sensitive to small perturbation to
payoffs and information structure, which can serve as an equilibrium selection device.2
When a unique equilibrium is selected by such device, strategic complementarity typically
ends up playing only a shock propagating role in increasing aggregate volatility, and again
there is no room for fluctuations to emerge endogenously.3
This paper proposes a theory of endogenous fluctuations where strategic comple-
mentarity plays a central role. The model envisages an economy of large population,
whose collective action determines the dynamics of the economy: if a large enough fraction
of agents is active, the aggregate output is likely to expand, otherwise fall. An expansion
benefits everyone, but particularly those who have been active thus introducing strategic
complementarity. With heterogeneous costs of action and incomplete information about
others’ costs, each agent must form belief and continuously update her belief as the econ-
omy evolves. Type heterogeneity and incomplete information enable a unique strategic
equilibrium to be selected, and the equilibrium dynamics is uniquely determined at any
given time.
The equilibrium is characterized by a persistent regime of high activity, where the
aggregate output keeps rising until some threshold is reached, after which the economy
enters a persistent contractionary phase, a regime of low activity. Fluctuations arise as
the economy endogenously and perpetually cycles between the two regimes. Regimes
are persistent because of belief hysteresis: the event of regime being high tomorrow
commands a higher posterior probability if a high regime is observed today, as agents
learn that fundamentals must be good enough to justify today’s expansion. Similarly, in a
1Cooper and John (1988) provide a generalization of the role of strategic complementarity and
multiple equilibria in macroeconomic context, the idea of which dated back to at least Goodwin (1951)
and Keynes’ discussion of animal spirit.
2Carlsson and van Damme (1993) are a seminal work on equilibrium selection in a coordination game
via an introduction of incomplete information about the game payoffs. The approach proves useful in
many macroeconomic applications, and has been extensively explored and generalized. See Morris and
Shin (2003).
3This volatility view of strategic complementarity is generally held by most recent works; for example
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) investigate the sensitivity of unique equilibrium to public information.
Angeletos and La’O (2012) discuss the propagation of shocks to higher-order beliefs, giving rise to
extrinsic-shocks driven fluctuations.
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contractionary regime, belief in a low activity equilibrium is reinforced by past observation
of low regime. This belief hysteresis results in a persistent play in the selected equilibrium,
where an attack on the existing regime never occurs until the expansion has continued for
an overly extended period. In the limit, every agent with a nontrivial strategic problem
chooses the same action, driving the expansion in a high regime, and the contraction in
a low regime.
A number of antecedents are related to this paper. In a seminal work on regime
shifts, Chamley (1999) studies a repeated coordination game where a unique equilibrium is
also selected and characterized by most players choosing the same action, with occasional
regime switches where the players simultaneously switch to the opposite action. The
model’s dynamics is driven by an aggregate shock, and regime switches occur when this
exogenous shock crosses some thresholds. Chamley’s model therefore views strategic com-
plementarity as a propagation mechanism. In contrast, our model produces endogenous
cycles in equilibrium, and a qualitatively different dynamic outcome. A key source of
departure is that in our model it is the dynamics of aggregate activity that is subject
to strategic complementarity in agents’ actions. The aggregate dynamic process has an
inherent stabilizing mechanism, as the game payoffs prohibit the aggregate variable from
following an explosive path. However, the endogenous dynamics introduces an additional
dimension to agents’ learning problem, allowing agents to test their belief about the
fundamentals as the state evolves. Under rational learning, this belief moves only with
inertia, leading to a lack of steady state. In a high regime, a successively higher output is
interpreted as reaffirming the fundamentals to be favorable, encourages agents to continue
being active and pushes output higher still, even if the system may in fact edge nearer
to its inevitable crash. The reinforcing interactions between learning from past history
and the higher-order beliefs allow the effect of regime persistence to dominate, in agents’
calculation, the possibility of an abrupt regime change. The failure to coordinate an early
regime switch implies that an expansion can continue prolongedly, forcing a crash only
late in a cycle, and similarly for recovery. An endogenous cycle emerges as a result, even
if the fundamentals in fact never change.
Our model’s learning dynamics generate a delay in a strategy switch, a property
highlighted in many existing works. In the model of bubble in Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003), rational players find it optimal to ride a bubble for a while, even if they know it
must eventually burst, because the incentives to delay selling and time the market make
it difficult to synchronize an attack on the bubble until late. In our model, strategic
delay to switching actions is also partly incentivized by a short-term gain to production
contribution, but crucially the extent of this delay is reinforced by belief hysteresis every
time there is an expansion without triggering a crash. The sustained belief hysteresis leads
to an outcome of maximal delay, and provides the main impetus in driving the cycle.4 In
4Belief hysteresis also exists in Chamley (1999) immediately after a regime switch, since agents know
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Caplin and Leahy (1994) and Chamley and Gale (1994), strategic delay results from the
unobservability of other private signals, with an abrupt macro adjustment taking place
only when private signals are strong enough for a sufficiently large number of individuals
to act, which then causes an information cascade. A form of information cascade also
features in our model, as a publicly observed regime switch reveals information about
private signals to all players, although in the presence of already maximal delay there is
no abrupt change in agents’ optimal strategy after such a switch.
Cycle theory has a long history in economics, but the paradigm is largely regarded as
the periphery rather than the core of macroeconomics.5 Firstly, the often deterministic
nature of the cycle model gives an excessively sharp prediction, casting doubt on its
ability to completely capture phenomenon as complex as the business cycle. Secondly,
it is unclear how the model may be empirically tested or fitted to the data. Finally, in
many models of this type, cycle is but one possible outcome coexisting along side many
others including a steady date, and is therefore far from being a generic description of
fluctuations.
Our model’s equilibrium cycle is free of these criticisms. The equilibrium is uniquely
selected, predicting fluctuations as a generic phenomenon. At the same time, the equilib-
rium cycle is modeled as a Markov process with asymmetric transition probabilities on a
closed loop, making the cycle noisy rather than deterministic. The equilibrium outcome
converges to a stationary distribution, which, we propose, is a natural equilibrium concept
for a model of recurring fluctuations. The equilibrium distribution allows quantitative
assessments of welfare and open doors for empirical investigation. In terms of policy
implications, we argue that ‘thinking cyclically’ in this way yields new insights that are
otherwise not available, while consistent with existing policy wisdom.
The model is set out in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the model’s basic properties
and the belief evolution dynamics. The key result of hysteresis and recurring regime
switching is derived in Section 4, which implies the existence of cycle. Section 5 provides
the conditions ensuring the equilibrium uniqueness. Section 6 explores the quantitative
welfare and policy implications of the model, using a simulation exercise, before Section
7 concludes.
a regime switch cannot be immediately followed by another switch. However, this hysteresis effect wanes
over time, as the information about the fundamentals become increasingly diffuse in the absence of a
regime switch. In our model, agents gain information from the evolution of aggregate variable, which
works to sustain the existing regime.
5The cycle approach counts among the early contributors such names as Richard Goodwin, John
Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor. Influential studies on financial crises such as Kindleberger and Aliber (2005)
and Minsky (2008) also describe crisis developments as following a recurring cycle pattern. Boldrin and
Woodford (1990) survey the cycle literature and discuss why the approach seems to have fallen out of
fashion.
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2 The Model
2.1 Production technology
Time t is discrete. There is a large population of size normalised to n, and the population
set is given by [zt, zt + n], where zt is a stochastic process. There is a single consumption
good, the stock of which is measured in discrete units yt ∈ Y = {0, 1, ..., N}. At the
beginning of period t, agent i ∈ [zt, zt + n] decides whether to contribute to the production
of yt, by choosing action xit ∈ {0, 1} denoting inactivity and investment respectively. The
evolution of yt is determined by joint investment efforts of all agents,
∫
i∈[zt,zt+n] xitdi, and
is modelled as a discrete-time birth-and-death process on Y. Specifically, the transition
probabilities for yt are given by
Pr
(
yt+1 = y
∣∣∣∣yt,∫
i∈[zt,zt+n]
xitdi
)
=

bt for y = yt + 1,
δ for y = yt,
1− bt − δ for y = yt − 1,
where δ > 0 is a constant, and bt is an increasing step function
bt =
{
bh for
∫
i∈[zt,zt+n] xitdi > n− κ,
bl for
∫
i∈[zt,zt+n] xitdi < n− κ,
(2.1)
where (1− δ) > bh > 1−δ2 > bl > 0, so that if the number of investing agents exceeds the
threshold n− κ, then the production of an additional unit of yt is more likely to succeed
than not. It is therefore natural to think of bh and bl as representing the expansionary
and contractionary regimes respectively (high and low regimes, in short). At boundary
states N or 0, the probability of yt+1 = yt is δ and that of reflection is 1− δ irrespective
of aggregate investment. Any tie-breaking rule for the case when
∫
i∈[zt,zt+n] xitdi = n− κ
can be chosen without affecting the key results.
2.2 Agents’ objective function
yt is a public good providing equal utility u (yt) to all agents for free in each period t. On
the other hand, contributing to the production of yt is costly. The investment costs differ
across agents, and agent i ∈ [zt, zt + n] incurs an investment cost ci (yt) if she decides to
invest in period t. In return, each agent who invests at time t will earn an extra private
lump-sum gain f at time t+1 if yt+1 = yt+1, i.e. if the production at time t is successful
in creating an extra unit of the good. Therefore, choosing to invest amounts to betting
that yt will go up next period. The return f provides private incentive to the production
of yt.
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Figure 1: Cost functions ci (y)
The objective function of agent i at time t is the lifetime discounted payoff
Uit = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t [u (ys)− xisci (ys) + fis]
where β is the discount factor and
fit =
{
f if yt − yt−1 = 1, and xit−1 = 1
0 otherwise.
Any individual agent’s decision whether to invest clearly depends on the prevailing regime,
which in turn depends on other agents’ investment decisions. As will become clear, agents
are effectively playing a coordination game.
The cost functions ci (yt) are assumed to take the following linear form
ci (yt) =
βf (bh − bl)
θ
(yt − i) + βfbl, i ∈ [zt, zt + n] (2.2)
where θ > 0. The identity index i serves to identify the cost ranking of agents (i = zt
being the highest-cost agent). The variable zt determines the aggregate investment cost of
the population, and is therefore a measure of underlying fundamentals. Because the cost
functions only depend on the difference yt − i, they satisfy the quasilinearity property,
i.e. any two functions are a horizontal parallel displacement of each other. The fact
that i ∈ [zt, zt + n] also implies a specific correlation structure between the agents’ costs,
amenable to an equilibrium selection mechanism that ensures a unique equilibrium always
obtains. Figure 1 plots the cost functions ci (y).
2.3 Timing
The game proceeds in three recurring stages as follow:
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1. At time t agents hold some identical belief about z∗t ≡ zt + κ, expressed as a
probability density function ht on a compact interval Zt (ht being zero on R\Zt). The
state yt is observed by everyone.
2. Given such beliefs, all agents choose actions simultaneously to maximise their ex-
pected utility. When the equilibrium is unique, the resulting regime is publicly observed.
Bayesian rational agents are allowed to revise their beliefs about z∗t . The updated common
belief is denoted by a density h˜t on an interval Z˜t. A new state yt+1 is selected according
to the transition probabilities defined by the regime.
3. After the regime is determined, zt+1 is randomly drawn from a commonly known
uniform transition density p (zt+1| zt), where
p (zt+1| zt) =
{
1
2ε
if zt+1 ∈ [zt − ε, zt + ε]
0 otherwise.
(2.3)
In other words, zt is a random walk. A new set of beliefs about zt+1 is generated from
this shock transition rule and the game returns to stage 1, continuing forever thereafter.
The parameters θ, κ, n and ε are taken to be large relative to 1, so that the dynamics
of beliefs can be analysed without being subject to the constraint set by the discreteness
of the state space Y . For instance, the assumption implies that yt − θ ≈ yt−1 − θ.
Furthermore, the case of special interest is where ε is small relative to θ, thus limiting
the role of exogenous shocks.
As the analysis will show, movements in zt are not the proximate cause of fluc-
tuations in yt. The randomness of zt keeps the posterior belief of zt diffuse and non-
degenerated, which ensures a unique equilibrium selection. Fluctuations in yt are instead
driven by persistence and hysteresis in the agents’ belief, which will be shown to cycle over
time. Therefore, fluctuations in this model arise from an endogenous cycle mechanism,
and not an amplification of exogenous shocks.
3 Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we first show that the lifetime discounted payoff defined by the stock of
goods yt is subject to strategic complementarity, and hence our model is essentially a
series of coordination games with learning over time. There would be multiple equilibria
in the complete information case, leading to indeterminate dynamics of yt for some range
of initial conditions. With incomplete information about zt, Bayesian rational agents
form beliefs about the value of zt using all available data, and under some conditions
about these beliefs and their evolution, there will exist a unique equilibrium that survives
iterated deletion of dominated strategies, characterized by a ‘switching strategy’. We
intuitively describe the stages of Bayesian learning in this environment, the resulting
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belief evolution, and the conditions under which a unique switching strategy equilibrium
obtains. We then highlight salient features of this belief distribution, central for describing
the equilibrium properties in the next section.
3.1 Strategic complementarity
Agent i uses all information available at time t, denoted I it , to form a belief about the
value of bt, expressed as a perceived probability over {bl, bh} . In view of this, let us define
piit = Pr
(
bt = bh| I it
)
(3.1)
and
Eit (bt) = pi
i
tbh +
(
1− piit
)
bl.
The value of being agent i at time t, V (I it) , is given by
V
(I it) = max
x∈{0,1}
{
u (yt)− xci (yt) + β
[
Eit (bt)xf + V˜
]}
. (3.2)
To understand equation 3.2, note that u (yt) − xci (yt) is simply the period-t payoff
conditional on investment decision x. It is convenient to use x ∈ {0, 1} as an indicator
function, so that the private return in period t + 1, conditional on yt+1 = yt + 1 and x,
is simply given by xf . Thus, the expected private return in period t + 1 as of time t
conditional on x is given by Eit (bt)xf . V˜ is a summation of terms involving pi
i
t, bh, bl, δ
and the corresponding V
(I it+1) . When optimising, each agent takes V˜ as a constant, as
no single agent can unilaterally affect the evolution of the aggregate stock.
It follows from the functional representation 3.2 then that investment (x = 1) is
optimal for agent i at time t if
βfEit (bt) > ci (yt) (3.3)
which can be reduced to
piit =
yt − i
θ
(3.4)
That is, agent i will invest at time t if she believes the probability of a high regime
is sufficiently high. But this probability piit is higher if and only if the underlying set
of strategy profiles assigns a larger number of agents to the investment strategy, as
agents know the rule determining the regime (equation 2.1). The payoff in each period
is therefore subject to strategic complementarity; the return to investment is increasing
in the number of opponents who are investing.
Not all agents’ decisions are subject to strategic considerations; for any agent i, a
dominant strategy may exist for sufficiently extreme values of yt. In particular, x = 1 is
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a dominant strategy for agent i if ci (yt) < βfbl, i.e. if yt − i < 0. Similarly x = 0 is a
dominant strategy if ci (yt) > βfbh, i.e. if yt − i > θ. Therefore any agent i ∈ [zt, zt + n]
does not have a dominant strategy if and only if yt ∈ [i, i+ θ]. Equivalently, for any fixed
yt, the set of agents without a dominant strategy is given by [yt − θ, yt].
If agent i = z∗t ≡ zt + κ has a dominant strategy to invest, all other agents with
lower costs also invest, and the regime is guaranteed to be high. When agent z∗t does
not have a dominant strategy, iterated elimination of dominated strategies can identify
a unique switching equilibrium, under which there exists a threshold agent i∗ such that
all i > i∗ invest, while the rest remain inactive. In this equilibrium, a high regime is
guaranteed if z∗t > i
∗, thus agent z∗t may be referred to as the decisive agent.
A delay to a regime switch occurs when a large fraction of agents in the strategically
nontrivial set [yt−θ, yt] remains invested in equilibrium as long as the regime is high (and
inactive when the regime is low). Thus, there is a greater delay in high regime if i∗ lies
closer to the lower bound of the interval, yt − θ (and in low regime if i∗ is closer to
yt). Longer delay means the prevailing regime has a reinforcing effect to sustain itself in
equilibrium, creating a history-dependent strategy, a property one may call hysteresis.
3.2 Learning and belief evolution
Each stage of the game can be described in more details as follow:
3.2.1 Stage 1: Initial beliefs
Since the same law of evolution is used by all agents for updating purposes, the class of
homogeneous beliefs is stationary. In solving the model, it therefore proves convenient
to specify some common initial belief. An obvious choice is the shock transition rule,
because it is exactly the belief held immediately after a regime switch, which reveals
momentarily the true value of zt. Thus, if the value of z
∗
0 is publicly known at time 1,
then the common belief is that
z∗1 is uniformly distributed on [z
∗
0 − ε, z∗0 + ε] .
This belief serves as a convenient starting point to compute the general stationary class
of homogeneous beliefs in equilibrium.6
6The class of homogeneous beliefs may additionally be dynamically stable under some technical
conditions, as successive learning gradually eliminates any initial belief heterogeneity. Provided that
agents’ beliefs of z∗ have the same mean and are distributed over the same support, their belief densities
converge to an identical normal distribution after repeated applications of the shock transition rule, by
virtue of the central limit theorem.
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3.2.2 Stage 2: Equilibrium play
Equilibrium uniqueness is an essential prerequisite for our analysis, as the measurability
of the strategy profile with respect to z∗t is needed for the laws of motion for beliefs to
be well-defined. The sufficient and necessary condition for there to be a unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium surviving iterated elimination of dominated strategies is established
by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) in the context of static global game analysis. By
a direct application of the global game argument, there is a unique equilibrium in the
present model if and only if for all t there exists a unique solution i∗t to the equation
Pr [z∗t > i
∗
t | It] ≡ H¯t (i∗t ) =
yt − i∗t
θ
, (3.5)
where H¯t (i) is 1−c.d.f. of belief,
H¯t (i) ≡
∫ supZt
z=i
ht (z) dz. (3.6)
The unique solution, if one exists, corresponds exactly to the unique switching equi-
librium, where every agent i < i∗t chooses x = 0, and every i > i
∗
t chooses x = 1.
7
Note that although there is no heterogeneity in the information set per se, it is the
heterogeneous assessments of z∗t relative to i that results in the applicability of iterated
dominance argument. The details of conditions ensuring a unique solution to equation
3.5 are deferred to section 5.
The existence of at least one dominance region is critical for iterated dominance
argument, and is easy to verify in this case. Suppose that the equilibrium has been unique,
and the regime switches from high to low at the end of time t. Since z∗t ∈ [inf Zt, i∗t ], the
lower bound for common belief support at time t+ 1 is given by inf Zt− ε. Note that we
must have inf Zt < yt − θ (as inf Zt > yt − θ would imply i∗t = yt − θ < inf Zt ≤ z∗ and
there cannot be a regime switch at time t, a contradiction). It follows that
inf Zt+1 = inf Zt − ε
< yt − θ − ε
≈ yt+1 − θ − ε
< yt+1 − θ
so that there exists a dominance region for a low regime; the decisive agent does not
invest as a dominant strategy with some probability. As ε is large relative to 1, this
region continues to exist throughout the regime. An analogous argument follows when
the regime switches from low to high.
7For a detailed derivation of this result, see Rungcharoenkitkul (2006).
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3.2.3 Stage 3: Learning via truncation and transition
At the end of the second stage, provided there exists a unique equilibrium and no
regime switch takes place, agents learn that the value of z∗t must be consistent with the
equilibrium regime and the current state yt. In particular, learning leads to a one-sided
truncation of ht. As before, since the model is symmetric with respect to the regimes, it
suffices to only consider a high regime as the initial condition. The updated distribution
is defined by the density h˜t where
h˜t (z
∗) =
 ht (z
∗) if inf Zt ≥ i∗t ,
ht(z∗)∫ supZt
z=i∗t
ht(z)dz
otherwise,
=
ht (z
∗)∫ supZt
z=max{i∗t ,inf Zt} ht (z) dz
, (3.7)
which is non-zero for z∗ ∈ Z˜t ≡ [max {i∗t , inf Zt} , supZt]. A truncation always gives rise
to a nondegenerate interval Z˜, as Z˜ being empty or a singleton would imply i∗t ≥ supZt,
i.e. i∗t ≥ z∗t which violates the assumption that there has not been a regime switch. On
the other hand, if there is a regime switch, say from high to low, at date t then a learning
truncation uses the complementary normalisation, i.e.
h˜t (z
∗) =
ht (z
∗)∫ i∗t
z=inf Zt
ht (z) dz
(3.8)
for z∗ ∈ Z˜t ≡ [inf Zt, i∗t ].
Following a shock transition in stage 3, the common belief at time t+ 1 is updated
using the shock transition probabilities. Specifically, ht+1 and Zt+1 are given by
ht+1 (z
∗) =
∫ z∗+ε
z=z∗−ε
p (z∗| z) h˜t (z) dz
=
1
2ε
∫ z∗+ε
z=z∗−ε
h˜t (z) dz, (3.9)
which is positive for
z∗ ∈ Zt+1 = [max {i∗t , inf Zt} − ε, supZt + ε] .
Stage 1 can then be repeated.
3.3 Properties of belief distribution
This section establishes the core properties of ht that are needed for the analysis of
hysteresis and equilibrium uniqueness. The results are stated in their logical order. Unless
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stated otherwise, the regime is assumed to be high initially.
First, we define the notion that a density is single-peaked or unimodal, using the
following standard definition (the proof for equivalence of each condition is trivial and
is omitted). As will be shown, unimodality is an equilibrium property of the belief
distribution.
Definition 1. ht (z
∗) is ‘unimodal’ if one of the following equivalent conditions holds
(1) ht is decreasing in |z∗ − arg maxht (z∗)|, i.e. it always declines away from its
unique peak, or
(2) as z∗ increases, the derivative h′t (z
∗) changes sign (from positive to negative)
at most once, or
(3) there exists z0 such that H¯t (z
∗) is concave for all z∗ < z0 and convex otherwise.
Agents only learn from the outcome of equilibrium play when the initial information
about the fundamental is sufficiently vague. For example, in the few periods immediately
after a regime switch, the information about the fundamental is already very precise that
an ex post equilibrium outcome is unlikely to convey any useful additional information.
The following result states that in any period there can be learning if and only if the
equilibrium play is not a corner solution. This result will play a useful role in ensuring
equilibrium uniqueness later (see the end of section 5.1).
Claim 1. Suppose that the regime is high and that there is a unique equilibrium in period
t. The equilibrium exhibits a strictly maximum delay in period t, i.e. i∗t = yt − θ, if and
only if inf Zt ≥ yt − θ. Furthermore, there is a maximum delay if and only if there is no
learning update (or truncation) in that period.
Proof. See appendix.
Let us now investigate the properties of the shock transition rule. Consider these
properties in the context of a pure shock transition, namely when there is no learning
truncation in the same period. Under a pure transition, we have h˜t = ht, and hence
ht+1 (z
∗) =
1
2ε
∫ z∗+ε
z=z∗−ε
ht (z) dz. (3.10)
In other words, ht+1 (z
∗) is an average of ht on the interval [z∗ − ε, z∗ + ε]. That the shock
transition rule preserves the symmetry of ht follows immediately from the symmetry of
p ( .| .). It is also trivial that the expected value of z∗t+1 is the same as that of z∗t . The
first important property of the transition mapping is that it leads to a belief of greater
‘riskiness’, as made precise in the next result.
Lemma 1. If ht+1 is a shock transition map of ht, then ht second-order stochastically
dominates ht+1.
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Proof. See appendix.
A necessary condition for unimodaltity to be an equilibrium property is the following
result.
Claim 2. The unimodality property of a density ht is preserved by the shock transition
rule.
Proof. See appendix.
The last result regarding the shock transition rule underpins the uniqueness result
to be obtained later.
Lemma 2. Suppose that ht is unimodal with a unique mode i
m
t , then under a pure
transition mapping,
(1) H¯t crosses H¯t+1 at some point(s) i
c
t on the interval [i
m
t − ε, imt + ε] ,
(2) if ht is concave on [i
m
t − 2ε, imt + 2ε], then there is a unique crossing point ict .
Proof. See appendix.
The concavity requirement is only a sufficient condition for there to be a single
crossing between H¯t and H¯t+1. The following result establishes a more general link
between the single crossing of the cumulative and the density.
Claim 3. On Zt+1\ {inf Zt+1, supZt+1}, H¯t+1 crosses H¯t once if and only if ht+1 crosses
ht twice.
Proof. See appendix.
Next we turn to investigate the effects of truncations on unimodality property.
Claim 4. If ht is unimodal, then h˜t is also unimodal, regardless of whether there is a
regime switch at date t. Furthermore, arg max h˜t (z
∗) ≥ arg maxht (z∗), with equality if
and only if i∗t ≤ arg maxht (z∗).
Proof. See appendix.
Claims 2 and 4 together suggest that if ht is unimodal then ht+1 is also uni-
modal. This fact implies that if the common belief is initially given by a unimodal
distribution, then it remains unimodal in all periods, and for any t, H¯t (i) is concave
for i < arg maxht (z
∗), and convex otherwise. To justify the unimodality assumption as
an equilibrium property, it is sufficient to assume that agents’ belief in the first period
of the game is a unimodal distribution. Even if agents initially hold a non-unimodal
belief in the first period, a sufficiently large number of pure shock transitions will lead
to a convergence to a unimodal distribution by the central limit theorem (see section 4.1
below). Henceforth, we restrict attention to the class of unimodal distributions.
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When there is a truncation in period t, equation 3.7 implies that h˜t ≥ ht on Z˜t,
with equality only at the points where ht = 0. Note also that inf Z˜t = i
∗
t > inf Zt and
sup Z˜t = supZt. The next result readily follows.
Claim 5. A left-sidedly truncated distribution first-order stochastically dominates the
original version. For example, if the regime is high and i∗t > inf Zt, then∫ supZt
z=z1
h˜t (z) dz ≥
∫ supZt
z=z1
ht (z) dz ∀z1 ∈ Zt,
with equality if and only if z1 ∈ (−∞, inf Zt] ∪ [supZt,∞).
Claim 5 captures the basic effect of a learning truncation; in the absence of a regime
switch, agents update their beliefs that the fundamental is conducive to the prevailing
regime. If the fundamental zt is fixed (but not observed), this truncation effect leads to
a greater delay and hysteresis next period (see Rungcharoenkitkul (2006)). Here, agents
can choose actions only after the fundamental has randomly moved, but the next result
states that the effect of learning truncation in terms of delay still holds.
Lemma 3. Provided the equilibrium is unique in all periods, a truncation in period t
leads to greater delay in period t+ 1, ceteris paribus.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 3 essentially says that the hysteresis effect of a learning truncation survives
the smoothing effect of transition. An immediate corollary is that a larger truncation
would lead to a correspondingly larger delay. We finish with the last result on the effect
of truncations on the mode of the distribution.
Claim 6. Left (right) truncations cannot lower (increase) the mode of the belief density,
ceteris paribus. Specifically, if a truncation (say from the left) implies i∗t < i
m
t+1 − ε, then
the truncation does not affect the mode, i.e. imt+1 is equal to that yielded from a pure
transition of ht.
Proof. See appendix.
4 Regime Switching and Hysteresis
This section focuses on analyzing the equilibrium hysteresis properties, with equilibrium
uniqueness assumed as a working hypothesis. The uniqueness conditions and its verifica-
tion will be the issue of the next section.
Due to stochastic z∗t , the belief evolution is not perfectly coupled with the yt process,
and the information updating may occur even if yt does not change over time. As a
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consequence, the exact degree of hysteresis will depend on both (1) the quantitative
impact of truncations (relative to yt dynamics) on the equilibrium, and (2) the frequency
of learning updates. In a high regime for instance, a rising yt will tend to raise i
∗
t
if either learning updates are infrequent, or learning truncations only increase H¯t (i)
marginally. Calculating the net hysteresis effect completely would require a computation
of an equilibrium outcome in every possible realisation of two dependent time series, yt
and the corresponding beliefs, a seemingly complicated task.
It is helpful to ask a far simpler question; what is the minimum level of hysteresis,
taken across all possible realisations of the stochastics, that can be supported without
violating the learning procedure? In other words, for a given yt, what is the largest value
of i∗t that could be justified by some history? We attempt to answer these questions by
considering two stages of learning separately.
4.1 The first truncation
In the presence of hysteresis effects, a regime switch from low to high releases a strong
public signal to all agents that the fundamental has to be good enough to force such a
switch given agents’ prior decisions to delay, which collectively favored the old regime.
Given a renewed high optimism, agents with a nondominant strategy may choose to invest
with probability one for a number of periods, i.e. the equilibrium is a corner solution
of maximum hysteresis for a certain length of time. Eventually however, the beliefs will
be sufficiently diffuse that the equilibrium becomes an interior solution again. The date
at which such an interior solution appears for the first time following a regime switch is
called the period of first truncation. That is, the periods preceding the first truncation
only involve pure shock transitions.
In the first date of truncation, the common belief distribution is exceptionally
tractable. The assumption that ε is small relative to θ implies that there is a large
number of pure shock transitions between regime switches, the accumulative effect of
which can be represented as a sum of independent random variables. Irrespective of the
initial belief which may be intractable in general, the central limit theorem can be invoked
to obtain a limiting distribution of z∗t , namely a normal distribution.
The period of first truncation also represents the first moment that a regime switch
is deemed by agents to be possible. The question is whether agents will aggressively
attack the existing regime in the first period that such an attack can be successful, or
act cautiously in that period. The answer of course depends on the belief distribution; if
agents believe that the probability of a regime switch is very small, they will act almost
as if they are certain that the existing regime will continue (as both sides of equilibrium
condition in equation 3.5 is continuous in i). Intuitively one may anticipate that in the
period of first truncation, the more uncertain agents are about the exact value of the
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fundamental (in the sense that the set of potential values of the fundamental is large),
the lower the probability that they will assign to a regime switch. Thus if the fundamental
has not been observed over a long period of time so that agents are very uncertain about
its value, then one may expect agents not to act too aggressively in favour of a regime
switch in the first period of truncation. We now seek to confirm this intuition analytically,
and thereby characterise the minimum level of hysteresis in the period of first truncation.
Suppose that there is a regime switch from low to high in period t = −1, and let
all agents hold the same belief in period t = 0 that z∗0 is a random variable distributed
nondegenerately on the interval Z0 ≡ [inf Z0, supZ0] with finite mean and variance,
µ0 ≡
∫
z∈Z0
zh0 (z) dz
σ20 ≡
∫
z∈Z0
(z − µ0)2 h0 (z) dz.
The following conjectures about the initial belief are assumed, and need to be verified as
part of the equilibrium properties.
Conjecture 1. |Z0| ≡ supZ0 − inf Z0 is small relative to θ.
Conjecture 2. 0 ≤ σ20
ε2
<∞.
Conjecture 3. There exists a constant γ ∈ (0, 1] independent of θ and ε such that
inf Z0 − y0 + θ = γθ.
Conjectures 1 and 2 place a limit on the fuzziness of the initial belief. Conjecture
3 requires that the equilibrium play in period t = −1 must not be degenerate in favour
of a regime switch. To see this, note that the existence of γ specified in conjecture 3
implies that inf Z0 is bounded away from y0− θ. Since inf Z0 = i∗−1− ε, the conjecture is
effectively i∗−1 > y−1−θ+ε. The condition holds in the presence of some hysteresis effects
in equilibrium, as then i∗−1 would be close to y−1. These conjectures will be verified as
being satisfied in equilibrium after proposition 2 is proved below.
After t periods, provided there is no truncation, we have inf Zt = inf Z0 − tε.
Let the first period of truncation be denoted by t1, i.e. t1 is the lowest t such that
inf Zt = inf Z0 − tε < yt − θ. The first result expresses t1 in terms of the primitive
parameters.
Claim 7. Suppose that conjecture 3 holds. As ε becomes large relative to 1, t1 is
approximately given by
t1 ' γθ
ε
.
Proof. By definition,
t1 = inf {t ∈ {0, 1, ...}| tε > min z∗0 − yt + θ}
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i.e. there is some small constant c1 < ε such that
t1ε = inf Z0 − yt1 + θ + c1
t1ε = inf Z0 − y0 + θ − (yt1 − y0) + c1
Since yt − y0 ∈ [−t, t], let us write yt − y0 = α1t where α1 ∈ [−1, 1] . Hence, using
conjecture 3, we have
t1ε = γθ − α1t+ c1
t1 =
γθ + c1
ε+ α1
' γθ
ε
as γθ is large relative to ε and ε is large relative to 1.
Consider the effect of pure transitions. Abstracting from truncations, and again
viewing z∗t as a random walk, z
∗
t can be written as
z∗t = z
∗
0 +
t∑
τ=1
Xτ
where each Xτ is an i.i.d random variable uniformly distributed on [−ε, ε]. It follows
from the uniform transition density that
E (Xτ ) = 0
V ar (Xτ ) =
ε2
3
.
Therefore z∗t is a sum of independent random variables, with
E (z∗t ) = µ0
V ar (z∗t ) = σ
2
0 +
tε2
3
.
A limiting case of interest is where there are a large number of pure transitions
before there is the first truncation. By the central limit theorem, for large t we have
z∗t → N
(
µ0, σ
2
0 +
tε2
3
)
so that after a large number of pure transitions,
ht (z
∗) ' 1√
2pi (σ20 + tε
2/3)
exp
[
− (z
∗ − µ0)2
2 (σ20 + tε
2/3)
]
. (4.1)
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Assume for the moment that a unique equilibrium is always ensured. Lemma 1
implies that there exists an interior equilibrium solution for the first time in the period of
first truncation, i.e. at date t1. Our present objective is to determine i
∗
t1
. As H¯t1 (i) is not
available in closed form, the strategy is to obtain an asymptotic approximation for i∗t1 .
Given that the regime is high, the unique interior equilibrium in period t1 is determined
by the intersection between (yt1 − i) /θ and the concave region of H¯t1 (i). One strategy
is then to derive an upper bound for i∗t1 by constructing a tractable auxiliary H¯
+
t1 (i) that
lies below H¯t1 (i) on the concave region. This procedure is followed in the proof of the
next proposition.
Proposition 1. Let t1 be the first period of truncation, and assume σ
2
0/ε
2 < ∞ as in
conjecture 2. Then
lim
t1→∞
i∗t1 = yt1 − θ.
Proof. Consider a point i1 = yt1 − θ+α2, for some small α2 > 0. At i1 and period t1, we
have from equation 4.1,
ht1 (i1) '
1√
2pi (σ20 + t1ε
2/3)
exp
[
−(yt1 − θ + α2 − µ0)
2
2 (σ20 + t1ε
2/3)
]
(4.2)
Using identical representations used in the proof of claim 7, we can write yt1 = y0 + α1t1
for some α1 ∈ [−1, 1], and µ0 − y0 + θ ' γθ, as µ0 −min z∗0 is of order smaller than θ by
conjecture 1. Then, using claim 7, we have
yt1 − θ + α2 − µ0 = − (µ0 − y0 + θ) + α1t1 + α2
= −γθ + α1γθ
ε
+ α2
' γθ
[α1
ε
− 1
]
' −γθ.
Using this equation and claim 7 again, equation 4.2 can be written as
ht1 (i1) '
1√
2pi (σ20 + t1ε
2/3)
exp
[
− (−γθ)
2
2 (σ20 + t1ε
2/3)
]
=
1√
2pi (σ20 + γθε/3)
exp
− 3 (γθε )
2
(
3σ20
ε2
(
ε
γθ
)
+ 1
)
 . (4.3)
Thus, since σ20/ε
2 <∞, ht1 (i1)→ 0 exponentially fast as γθ/ε→∞.
Let us define an auxiliary function h+t1 on [inf Zt1 , i1] as
h+t1(i) = ht1 (i1) , for all i ∈ [inf Zt1 , i1] .
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Figure 6-1:
Figure 6-1 demonstrates the construction of K¯+w1 (l) and consequently the approximation
for lWw1.
Let us check the existence. From the diagram, there exists a solution to
K¯+w1 (l) =
|w1  l

(6.19)
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Figure 2: Construction of H¯+t1 (i)
The corresponding negative c.d.f is given as usual by,
H¯+t1 (i) = 1−
∫ i
z=inf Zt1
h+t1(z)dz
= 1− ht1 (i1) [i− inf Zt1 ] (4.4)
Figure 2 demonstrates the construction of H¯+t1 (i) and consequently the approximation
for i∗t1 .
Let us check the existence. From the diagram, there exists a solution to
H¯+t1 (i) =
yt1 − i
θ
(4.5)
if and only if
H¯+t1 (i1) >
yt1 − i1
θ
= 1− α2
θ
. (4.6)
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But from equation 4.4,
H¯+t1 (i1) = 1− ht1 (i1) [i1 − inf Zt1 ]
≥ 1− ht1 (i1) [α2 + ε] (4.7)
where the last step follows from the definition of i1 and the fact that inf Zt1 ≥ yt1−θ−ε (as
otherwise there would have been a truncation prior to date t1). According to equation 4.3,
as θ becomes large, ht1 (i1)→ 0 exponentially fast. Thus in equation 4.7, the lower bound
for H¯+t1 (i1) and consequently H¯
+
t1 (i1) itself also tend to 1 exponentially in θ. Therefore
the L.H.S of equation 4.6 tends to 1 at a faster rate than the R.H.S, and a fixed point
solution to equation 4.5 always exists for any i1 given a sufficiently large θ.
Note that as θ/ε (and hence t1) becomes large, the normal density approximates
the tail of H¯t1 more and more accurately, so that by the concavity of H¯t1 , H¯
+
t1 (i) lies
everywhere beneath H¯t1 (i) for i ∈ [inf Zt1 , i1] in the limit. Therefore the fixed point
solution to equation 4.5 provides a limiting upper bound for the actual i∗t1 . Thus, denoting
the solution to equation 4.5 by sup i∗t1 , we have from combining equations 4.4 and 4.5,
sup i∗t1 [1− θht1 (i1)] = yt1 − θ + θht1 (i1) inf Zt1
but because ht1 (i1) tends to zero exponentially in θ, limθ→∞ θht1 (i1) = 0. Hence
lim
θ→∞
[
sup i∗t1
]
= yt1 − θ
and the proof is complete.
Thus, the longer it takes before there is a positive probability of a regime switch
being triggered by a dominant strategy, the greater the hysteresis effect at that first
period of truncation. Intuitively, a large number of pure shock transitions increases the
uncertainty about z∗t1 in such a way that agents assign an increasing probability to z
∗
t1
being too high to justify a regime switch in the first period of learning. In this case,
maximum hysteresis is the limiting outcome at date t1.
What happens in the periods after the first truncation? Will there continue to be
strong hysteresis effect? These questions are addressed next.
4.2 Hysteresis in generic periods
Consider an arbitrary date t where H¯t (i) gives rise to an interior equilibrium i
∗
t > yt− θ.
The objective in this section is to place an upper bound on the level of i∗t that may be
realised in any period t, after some arbitrary sequence of belief truncations and state
transitions. In other words, we seek to quantify the minimum level of hysteresis at an
arbitrary date t.
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In a generic period, it is possible for beliefs to fluctuate. Suppose the common
belief is pessimistic and assigns a high probability to zt being low. A regime switch is
believed to be more likely at time t. This common belief would lead to a small delay
in period t and a correspondingly large i∗t , so that an absence of a regime switch would
imply a significant learning truncation in that period. Because it is common knowledge
that fewer agents are investing and yet the regime still remains high, all agents become
relatively more optimistic that the true fundamental is in fact favourable. If such a boost
in optimism is sufficiently strong, it can in turn lead to a number of consecutive periods
of maximum delay. In other words, pessimistic beliefs are reversed to optimistic ones by
the absence of a regime change.
On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that ‘bubbles’ in the common belief may
develop over time, leading agents to believe that a regime switch is just ‘around the
corner’. That is, they are confident about a high regime today, whilst being convinced
about a crash tomorrow. In a high regime, this would imply that the common knowledge
density is highly skewed to the right. The skewness of the belief density, once obtained,
may be persistent, leading to a similar pattern of play over time. In such a case,
there would be large but occasional truncations, and the common knowledge evolution is
characterised by spells of optimism (causing maximum delay) interrupted by occasional
bursts of pessimism (leading to truncations). Because of this feedback effect, beliefs may
cycle between optimistic and pessimistic phases.
The apparent instability of the common belief adds to the complexity of determin-
ing ht explicitly over time. Nonetheless, some important quantitative implications for
hysteresis may be assessed without knowing the exact forms of ht. First, note that the
actual timing of a regime switch depends on the speed of yt evolution relative to that of
the common belief dynamics. Suppose that the agents’ beliefs fluctuate between a very
brief but severe phase of pessimism and a long spell of optimism. If beliefs cycle at a
very high speed relative to the dynamics of yt, then almost every visited state yt will be
tested against the severe pessimism phase. A regime switch therefore takes place as soon
as the economy reaches the critical state yt that cannot be supported by the pessimistic
belief. Temporary delay therefore cannot lead to a significant hysteresis when beliefs
evolve quickly.
Secondly, the assumption of a unique equilibrium at time t−1 clearly implies certain
restrictions on ht−1. These restrictions in turn place constraints on the form that ht may
take, and hence on the ensuing degree of delay at (arbitrary) date t. It turns out that the
equilibrium uniqueness implies an upper bound on the degree of skewness of the belief
density, and hence a lower bound on the degree of delay in any period, leading to the
next key result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the regime is high, and the equilibrium is unique in periods
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Figure 6-2: A ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant distribution leads to greater delay.
For convenience, we reproduce equation 6.8
kw (l) =
1
2%
Z l+%
}=l3%
k˜w31 (}) g}>
and deﬁne
eKw31 (l)  Z sup]w31
}=l
k˜w31 (}) g}= (6.22)
As kw is related to k˜w31 according to equation 6.8 , the ﬁrst step is to characterise the class
of k˜w31 consistent with a unique equilibrium in period w  1. Recall from equation 6.6
that k˜w31 is either identical to kw31 or is a left-sidedly truncated version of it, depending
on whether inf ]w31  lWw31. In terms of the c.d.f, this corresponds to eKw31 (l)  K¯w31 (l).
Consider two possibilities in turn. First, if eKw31 (l) = K¯w31 (l) then there is no truncation
in period w  1, implying that the equilibrium is a corner solution of lWw31 = |w31  .
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Figure 3: A first-order stochastic dominant distribution leads to greater delay
t− 1 and t. Then
i∗t ≤ yt − θ + ε.
Proof. The objective is to derive an upper bound on i∗t for any arbitrary date t, where no
restriction is imposed on ht and ht−1 except that they must yield a unique equilibrium
in period t and t − 1. For i∗t to take its maximum value, it clearly has to be an interior
solution, i.e. inf Zt < yt − θ. As learning truncations potentially take place prior to date
t, agents cannot believe zt to be too low and we must have inf Zt ≥ yt − θ − ε, thus in
sum inf Zt ∈ [yt − θ − ε, yt − θ). On the other hand, because equation 5.6 always holds
(as a consequence of claim 1; see the discussion following section 5.1) and ε is big relative
to one, it follows that supZt > yt for any time t after a regime switch. Let us consider an
arbitrary fixed pair of inf Zt and supZt that satisfy such constraints. Suppose that two
distributions over the fixed support Zt are rankable in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. Under the assumption that there is a unique equilibrium in period t, it
follows from a simple graph-theoretic argument (see figure 3) that the distribution which
first-order stochastically dominates the other leads to a smaller equilibrium i∗t . Thus, i
∗
t
is at its greatest if the underlying distribution ht is first-order stochastically dominated
by all other possible distributions within the class of interests. If any distribution ht is
possible, then the upper bound for i∗t is uninterestingly given by yt with the underlying
distribution being H¯t−1 (i) = 0, ∀i. The next step of our proof is to characterise the class
of distributions of interests, namely those which are consistent with a unique equilibrium
at each date t− 1 and t.
For convenience, we reproduce equation 3.9
ht (i) =
1
2ε
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
h˜t−1 (z) dz,
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and define
H˜t−1 (i) ≡
∫ supZt−1
z=i
h˜t−1 (z) dz. (4.8)
As ht is related to h˜t−1 according to equation 3.9 , the first step is to characterise the class
of h˜t−1 consistent with a unique equilibrium in period t − 1. Recall from equation 3.7
that h˜t−1 is either identical to ht−1 or is a left-sidedly truncated version of it, depending
on whether inf Zt−1 ≥ i∗t−1. In terms of the c.d.f, this corresponds to H˜t−1 (i) ≥ H¯t−1 (i).
Consider two possibilities in turn. First, if H˜t−1 (i) = H¯t−1 (i) then there is no truncation
in period t−1, implying that the equilibrium is a corner solution of i∗t−1 = yt−1−θ. Because
there is no other equilibrium, H˜t−1 (i) and H¯t−1 (i) must lie above (yt−1 − i) /θ for all
i ∈ (yt−1 − θ, yt−1]. On the other hand, if H˜t−1 (i) > H¯t−1 (i) then there is a truncation
in period t − 1 and H˜t−1 (i) > H¯t−1 (i) > (yt−1 − i) /θ for i > i∗t−1 and H˜t−1 (i) =
1 > (yt−1 − i) /θ for i ∈
(
yt−1 − θ, i∗t−1
]
. Hence conditional on there being a unique
equilibrium in period t − 1, one can conclude that H˜t−1 (i) must lie above (yt−1 − i) /θ
everywhere except perhaps at the singular point i = yt−1 − θ. Let us call the class of
distributions H˜t−1 (i) with such property the uniqueness class .
For any fixed support Zt, there corresponds a unique Z˜t−1 ≡ [inf Zt + ε, supZt − ε].
On the support Z˜t−1, let us define, for a small e > 0, a benchmark distribution
h˜et−1 (i) ≡
1
θ
, for i ∈ [yt−1 − θ + e, yt−1 + e] ,
and zero otherwise, with the corresponding c.d.f.
H˜et−1 (i) ≡
yt−1 − i
θ
+
e
θ
.
Clearly lime→0 H˜et−1 (i) is first-order stochastically dominated by all other distributions in
the uniqueness class. Recall from the proof of 3 that the shock transition rule in equation
3.9 preserves the first-order stochastic dominance ordering. In other words, as e→ 0, the
benchmark density h˜et−1 generates a belief density at time t, say h
e
t , that is stochastically
dominated by all other densities ht which are a shock transition rule of the uniqueness
class. Hence, an upper bound on i∗t is simply the limit as e→ 0 of the solution to
H¯et (i) ≡
∫ supZt
z=i
het (z) dz =
yt − i
θ
(4.9)
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Figure 4: Construction of H¯et and h
e
t
where
het (i) =
1
2ε
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
h˜et−1 (z) dz
=

1
θ
for i ∈ [yt − θ + e+ ε, yt + e− ε]
i−(yt−θ+e−ε)
2εθ
for i ∈ [yt − θ + e− ε, yt − θ + e+ ε]
−i+(yt+e+ε)
2εθ
for i ∈ [yt + e− ε, yt + e+ ε]
.
Figure 4 illustrates the construction of H¯et and h
e
t .
It can be readily checked that H¯et (i) = H˜
e
t−1 (i) for i ∈ [yt − θ + e+ ε, yt + e− ε]
and H¯et (i) > H˜
e
t−1 (i) for i > yt + e − ε, hence the fixed point solution to equation 4.9
must lie in the interval [yt − θ, yt − θ + e+ ε]. Take the limit e→ 0, and the proposition
is proved.
Since ε is small relative to θ, proposition 2 states that there is a significant hysteresis
in equilibrium. Significant hysteresis in both regimes in turn suggests that the state
variable yt can cycle, even if there is no actual change in the fundamental variable zt. A
high regime persists and yt tends to rise, until yt = z
∗
t + θ is reached, inducing a regime
switch. A low regime then ensues, yt declines until yt = z
∗
t is hit, and the regime switches
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back to high. Even if there is in fact no change in zt, yt tends to fluctuate in a unique
equilibrium cycle.
Proposition 2 sheds light on the equilibrium properties, allowing us to verify con-
jectures 1, 2 and 3 made earlier.
Claim 8. Conjectures 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that there is a regime switch from low to high in period −1, so that
Z−1 =
[
i∗−1, supZ−1
]
. Because of the model’s symmetry with respect to the regimes,
proposition 2 adjusted for a low regime implies that i∗−1 ≥ y−1 − ε. Because of learning
truncations, we also have supZ−1 ≤ y−1 + ε. Thus
Z0 =
[
i∗−1 − ε, supZ−1 + ε
]
⊆ [y−1 − 2ε, y−1 + 2ε]
so that
|Z0| ≤ 4ε θ
validating conjecture 1. Next, note that
σ20
ε2
=
∫
z∈Z0
(
z − µ0
ε
)2
h0 (z) dz.
Since µ0 ∈ Z0, it follows that for any z ∈ Z0
z − µ0
ε
≤ |Z0|
ε
≤ 4.
Thus σ20/ε
2 < ∞ and conjecture 2 is verified. Lastly, i∗−1 ≥ y−1 − ε > y−1 − θ + ε and
hence conjecture 3 is satisfied.
5 Equilibrium Uniqueness Conditions
We now detail the conditions under which equilibrium uniqueness can be guaranteed, and
verify whether these conditions are met.
5.1 Contraction arguments
A sufficient condition for uniqueness can be based on contraction mapping condition:
− ∂
∂i
H¯t (i) <
1
θ
for all i ∈ [yt − θ, yt] . (5.1)
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When this condition holds, it is clear that there is a unique solution to equation 3.5.
Using Leibniz’s rule on equation 3.6 gives
− ∂
∂i
H¯t (i) = ht (i) , (5.2)
so that the uniqueness condition 5.1 is simply
max
i∈[yt−θ,yt]
ht (i) <
1
θ
. (5.3)
In general, uniqueness requires the beliefs about z∗t to be sufficiently diffuse, and condition
5.3 gives one measure of such diffusion in terms of the sup-norm of the belief posterior.
While the sufficient condition based on sup-norm contraction can be a powerful tool,
it will prove to be too strong in the present case. Intuitively, beliefs about z∗t in the first
few periods immediately after a regime switch will be relatively precise, and condition 5.3
may only hold when ε is restricted to be very large relative to θ. When ε is small relative
to θ, which is the main case of interest, it will be shown in section 5.3 that even after
a large number of belief updates, the condition still cannot be guaranteed although the
equilibrium may well be unique. A less demanding condition for uniqueness is therefore
required.
Consider an alternative criterion, related to the degree of concavity of H¯t (i). Note
that by an argument that is topologically equivalent to a contraction mapping, if H¯t (yt) >
0, then the concavity everywhere of H¯t (i) ensures a unique equilibrium. Similarly, if
H¯t (yt − θ) < 1, then an everywhere convex H¯t (i) implies uniqueness. In general, of
course, H¯t (i) is only concave on a certain set and convex otherwise. But suppose that
one starts in a high regime and that H¯t (yt) > 0, then it is easy to see that a unique
equilibrium ensues if
whenever H¯t (i) is convex, H¯t (i) >
yt − i
θ
. (5.4)
The condition can also be equivalently expressed as follows. Restrict attention to the
range of i for which H¯t (i) is convex, and define i
θ
t by the solution
8 to
− ∂H¯t (i)
∂i
∣∣∣∣
iθt
= ht
(
iθt
)
=
1
θ
then there is a unique equilibrium if
H¯t
(
iθt
)
>
yt − iθt
θ
. (5.5)
8Since ht is always unimodal, there is a unique such solution if one restricts attention to the convex
range of H¯t (i.e. decreasing range of ht).
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Figure 6-4: A convexity-based condition for a unique equilibrium, and the ﬁrst right
crossing between K¯w+1 and K¯w.
then there is a unique equilibrium if
K¯w
¡
lw
¢
A
|w  lw

= (6.28)
Figure 6-4 depicts how condition 6.28 implies a unique equilibrium. The ‘bounded con-
vexity condition’3 speciﬁed in equation 6.28 supplements the bounded sup-norm in equa-
tion 6.26. Clearly, if there is no solution lw to kw
¡
lw
¢
= 1@, then it must follow that
kw (l) ? 1@ for all l, and the bounded sup-norm condition 6.26 is satisﬁed.
The prerequisite that K¯w (|w) A 0 for all w (if one is in a high regime) is intuitively
a requirement that agents must always believe that the decisive group has a dominant
3This terminology is non-standard, but is adopted here to highlight the underlying idea. The condition
essentially requires that K¯w cannot be too convex.
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Figure 5: A convexity-based condition for a unique equilibrium, and the first right
crossing between H¯t+1 and H¯t.
Figure 5 depicts how the ‘bounded convexity condition’ condition 5.5 implies a unique
equilibrium. The condition supplements the bounded sup-norm in equation 5.3. Clearly,
if there is no solution iθt to ht
(
iθt
)
= 1/θ, then it must follow that ht (i) < 1/θ for all i,
and the bounded sup-norm condition 5.3 is satisfied.
The prerequisite that H¯t (yt) > 0 for all t (if one is in a high regime) is intuitively
a requirement that agents must always believe that the decisive agent has a dominant
strategy with a positiv probability. In fact, for H¯t (y ) to be larger than 0 for all t in a
high regime, it is sufficient to show that H¯t (yt) > 0 at the starting date of the regime
(i.e. in the period after the regime switches from low to high). This is because ε is large
relative to 1 and agents continue assigning positive weights to fundamental exceeding yt
as long as the high regime continues. Intuitively, it is immediately after a regime switch
and a transition that follows, that the information about the fundamentals is closest to
being complete. The applicability of global game technique relies on the shock transition
rule to introduce enough uncertain y in this stage. If after a transition, all agents believe
with probability one that the true fundamental variable lies within a set defining some
coordination game, then the iterated dominance argument fails and there is a multiplicity.
The common belief support must therefore be large enough so that the fundamental lies
in the dominance region with some probability.
Claim 1 can be used at this point to show that this condition is always satisfied.
More concretely, let us suppose that there is a regime switch from high to low at date
t.9 The objective is to prove that H¯t+1 (yt+1 − θ) > 0, as we now explain briefly. In the
beginning of period t + 1 agents believe that z∗t+1 is distributed over [inf Zt − ε, i∗t + ε],
where both i∗t and Zt are common knowledge. If inf Zt− ε > yt+1− θ, then agents believe
9We change our convention and choose a low regime as the starting point here so that claim 1 may
be applied directly. Recall that the model is symmetric with respect to the regimes.
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with probability one that z∗t+1 ∈ [yt+1 − θ, yt+1], so that the decisive group of agents will
definitely play a coordination game in period t+1 and there must be a multiplicity. Thus
a necessary condition for uniqueness in the first period given that the regime just switches
to low is that
inf Zt − ε < yt+1 − θ (5.6)
which is identical to H¯t+1 (yt+1 − θ) > 0. That this condition is always satisfied can now
be verified using claim 1. Consider date t at which there is a regime switch from high
to low. The equilibrium at that date is either a corner solution (i∗t = yt − θ) or interior
(i∗t > yt − θ). If it is a corner solution, then the fact that z∗t ≥ inf Zt ≥ yt − θ must
imply that z∗t = yt − θ for there to be a regime switch. Thus the true z∗t becomes
common knowledge, i.e. Zt = {z∗t }.10 It follows that, in period t + 1, agents believe
that z∗t+1 ∈ [z∗t − ε, z∗t + ε] = [yt − θ − ε, yt − θ + ε] ≈ [yt+1 − θ − ε, yt+1 − θ + ε], so that
z∗t − ε ≈ yt+1 − θ − ε < yt+1 − θ and the condition 5.6 is satisfied. On the other hand,
suppose more generally that the equilibrium is interior. Then it follows from the claim
that inf Zt < yt− θ, and hence inf Zt− ε < yt− θ− ε ≈ yt+1− θ− ε < yt+1− θ, and again
the condition is satisfied.
5.2 A recursive condition
The procedure for checking equilibrium uniqueness can be summarised as follows. If
the bounded sup-norm condition in equation 5.3 is satisfied, then there is a unique
equilibrium, otherwise we proceed to check if both H¯t (yt) > 0 and the bounded convexity
condition in equation 5.5 hold. When all conditions fail, it is concluded that there is a
multiplicity. Analogous conditions can be written down for the case where the initial
regime is low.
Given the dynamic nature of the common belief, it must be determined how the
equilibrium uniqueness considerations develop over time. Towards this end, it would
be useful to have a set of sufficient conditions under which uniqueness can be implied
recursively, namely that uniqueness in period t would imply uniqueness in period t + 1.
Let us refer to such a set of sufficient conditions as the recursive condition for short. For
example, the first-order stochastic dominance is a recursive condition; H¯t+1 being greater
than H¯t everywhere is sufficient to ensure that condition 5.4 is recursive, provided that
H¯t+1 − H¯t is large relative to 1/θ (which holds since θ is assumed large). However, this
particular recursive condition is of limited use, as it obviously cannot be met for all t,
e.g. under a pure transition, H¯t+1 must cross H¯t at least once for any H¯t. Intuitively,
equilibrium uniqueness is recursive in this case because the first-order stochastic domi-
nance rules out additional equilibria where agents attack the existing regime earlier, by
10This is precisely the singular case mentioned earlier in which the information about the fundamentals
are complete.
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requiring the common belief to become more biased in favour of greater delay.
The essential property of a recursive condition is that the common belief in each
period must become sufficiently more diffuse over time, so that there does not exist addi-
tional equilibria on which agents can coordinate. Specifically, in view of the uniqueness
condition 5.5, the shock transition rule must lead to a ‘convexity contraction’11, so that the
validity of iterated dominance can be inferred recursively; namely H¯t
(
iθt
)
>
(
yt − iθt
)
/θ
implies H¯t+1
(
iθt+1
)
>
(
yt+1 − iθt+1
)
/θ.
Let us construct a recursive condition with such property. Suppose that at time
t, the regime is high and the bounded convexity condition 5.5 is met. Consider figure
5 again, where both H¯t and H¯t+1 are plotted. As we have not ascertained if H¯t may
cross H¯t+1 several times in general, let i
c
t denote the point at which H¯t+1 crosses H¯t from
the right for the first time (and necessarily from above), so that H¯t+1 (i) > H¯t (i) for all
i > ict .
12 Note that uniqueness in period t implies that H¯t (i) > (yt − i) /θ for all i > i∗t .
The strategy is to exploit this fact and work out the conditions under which H¯t can serve
as a lower bound for H¯t+1 at i
θ
t+1, i.e. the point where −∂H¯t+1/∂i = 1/θ. In other words,
we seek to establish conditions under which we are able to write
H¯t+1
(
iθt+1
)
> H¯t
(
iθt+1
)
(5.7)
>
yt − iθt+1
θ
(5.8)
' yt+1 − i
θ
t+1
θ
and hence conclude that there is a unique equilibrium in period t+ 1.
A construction of a recursive condition amounts to obtaining two sufficient condi-
tions that ensure inequalities 5.7 and 5.8 are both satisfied. Since H¯t+1 (i) > H¯t (i) for
all i > ict , a sufficient condition for inequality 5.7 to hold is that i
θ
t+1 > i
c
t . On the other
hand because there is a unique equilibrium in period t, for inequality 5.8 to hold, it is
sufficient and necessary that iθt+1 > i
∗
t . Thus, a recursive condition is simply given by
iθt+1 > max {ict , i∗t} . (5.9)
There exists a variety of sufficient conditions that would guarantee that this recur-
sive condition holds. For instance, a condition may be rewritten in terms of the density.
11Namely the bounded convexity condition must be recursive, so that when condition 5.5 is met in
period t, it is also met in period t+ 1. On the other hand, a shock transition rule always implies a sup-
norm contraction in the belief density. To see this, recall that a shock transition rule of ht (z) is merely
its average over the interval [z − ε, z + ε]. Clearly, on any fixed interval, the average cannot exceed the
supremum. Hence, the supremum of averages of ht cannot exceed the supremum of ht itself.
12This is a slight abuse of notation, as ict was defined earlier in lemma 2 as any crossing point. No
confusion should arise however, as no other results have relied on that notation.
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Because of the unimodality of ht+1, a sufficient condition for i
θ
t+1 > max {ict , i∗t} is that
ht+1 (max {ict , i∗t}) >
1
θ
. (5.10)
Alternatively, a condition based on the mode imt may be constructed. Suppose that we
always have ict > i
∗
t , so that one only needs to show i
θ
t+1 > i
c
t . Since i
θ
t+1 > i
m
t+1, a sufficient
condition for iθt+1 > i
c
t comprises two inequalities
imt+1 ≥ imt > ict . (5.11)
5.3 Verifying uniqueness
Somewhat surprisingly, an implication of the limiting result in equation 4.1 is that the
equilibrium uniqueness prior to the first truncation cannot be guaranteed by the sup-
norm contraction condition 5.3 alone no matter how large is the number of pure shock
transitions. As ht (z
∗) is unimodal and attains its maximum at z∗ = E (z∗t ) = µ0, we
have
supht ≈
[
2pi
(
σ20 + tε
2/3
)]− 1
2 . (5.12)
Thus, a sufficient condition for uniqueness according to equation 5.3 is given by
θ <
√
2pi (σ20 + tε
2/3) (5.13)
t >
3 (θ2 − 2piσ20)
2piε2
.
The right hand side of equation 5.13 is the minimum number of pure transitions required
before uniqueness can be guaranteed by the sup-norm contraction condition in equation
5.3. By claim 7, the expected number of periods before the first truncation is proportional
to θ/ε, whilst the right hand side of equation 5.13 is of the order (θ/ε)2. In other
words, the first truncation takes place before the contraction condition can be satisfied.
Therefore, in ensuring uniqueness in the case of pure transitions, the convexity contraction
condition must be used.
It is instructive to consider two distinct phases of the learning process separately,
and derive uniqueness conditions for each case. The first phase of learning starts in
the period immediately after a regime switch. In this phase, subject to the initial belief,
agents update their common belief using the shock transition rule alone. After sufficiently
many periods of pure shock transition rules, the common belief approximately follows a
normal distribution by the central limit theorem. This marks the start of the second
phase, which continues until the first learning truncation and subsequently the regime
switch. Each phase is now considered in turn.
Suppose that there is a regime switch from low to high in period 0, and that there
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is a unique equilibrium in that period. Since there is a regime switch in period 0, h˜0 is
defined as in equation 3.8 suitably adjusted for a low regime, i.e.
h˜0 (z
∗) =
h0 (z
∗)∫ supZ0
z=i∗0
h0 (z) dz
.
In other words, h˜0 is a left-sidedly truncated version of h0, and hence following claim 5
we have
H˜0 (i) > H¯0 (i) , for i ∈ [i∗0, supZ0] .
But since there is a unique equilibrium in period 0, we must have
H¯0 (i) >
y0 − i
θ
i > i∗0,
so that we also have
H˜0 (i) >
y0 − i
θ
for i ∈ [i∗0, supZ0] .
In other words, the equilibrium would still remain unique if agents were able to act after
the truncation. Thus, there is a unique equilibrium in period 1 if the shock transition
rule on h˜0 satisfies a recursive condition. Using condition 5.10, we have
h1
(
max
{
i˜c0,
y0 − i
θ
})
>
1
θ
(5.14)
where we let i˜c0 denote the first right crossing point between H¯1 and H˜0. Note that for
sufficiently large θ, the R.H.S tends to 0, whilst the L.H.S tends to h1
(˜
ic0
)
which is
independent of θ. Furthermore, h1
(˜
ic0
)
is large relative to 1/θ if ε is relatively small,
i.e. when the smoothing effect takes place slowly. Thus uniqueness carries over for large
θ and low ε. Similar arguments can be used for subsequent periods in this phase to
infer uniqueness recursively. It may be noted that the sup-norm contraction condition
for uniqueness is harder to satisfy for large θ, whereas the opposite is the case for the
convexity contraction condition.
Whilst the above argument remains valid in the second phase of the learning process,
there exists a far simpler sufficient condition in this case. Once ht settles down into a
normal distribution, the mode becomes static over time and because the density becomes
symmetric, we have
imt+1 = i
m
t = i
c
t .
In this special case, one needs not have the strict inequality imt > i
c
t to ensure recursive
uniqueness. Since equilibrium is a corner solution in this phase, we have ict > i
∗
t and
it always follows that iθt+1 > i
m
t+1 = i
m
t = i
c
t . Thus as long as the distribution remains
normal, the equilibrium remains unique.
31
Consider next the periods after the first truncation. Claim 6 implies that the mode
of the belief density will remain static as long as i∗t < yt − θ + ε < imt − ε, i.e. if
yt − θ < imt − 2ε.
The belief density ceases to be symmetric here however, thus the argument used in the
previous paragraph does not apply. Note that by virtue of lemma 3 which essentially
states that the transition mapping perserves first-order stochastic dominance, left-sided
truncations imply that in the first period of truncation we must have
ict < i
m
t
since a pure transition would imply ict = i
m
t . Thus, condition 5.11 above is satisfied, and
again equilibrium uniqueness is recursive.
Over the subsequent periods, it is less clear-cut whether a recursive condition is
satisfied. Nonetheless, recall from lemma 2 that ict ∈ [imt − ε, imt + ε], and consider
condition 5.10 again. Suppose that ict > i
∗
t , then uniqueness is recursive if ht+1 (i
c
t) > 1/θ.
Because ht is continuous, for small ε we have approximately ht+1 (i
c
t) ' ht+1 (imt ). Then,
either ht+1 (i
c
t) ' ht+1 (imt ) > 1/θ in which case uniqueness is recursive due to the
convexity contraction, or ht+1 (i
c
t) ' ht+1 (imt ) < 1/θ and the same conclusion follows
from the sup-norm contraction.
5.4 Discussion
All aforementioned conditions shares a unifying mechanism central for the uniqueness
result. The general mechanism has been identified in the literature on heterogeneity in
interactions games (for a survey, see Morris and Shin (2002)) as the invariance of strategic
uncertainty with respect to players’ types. In our model, the belief about the fundamental
is common knowledge, and therefore players can fully work out the strategy of agents with
any costs. Invariance of strategic uncertainty here requires that agent’s level of optimism
about the fundamental relative to her tolerance level, i.e. her investment cost, does not
vary too much with her cost. Each way of measuring this invariance gives rise to a
different uniqueness condition.
The proposed uniqueness conditions are only sufficient conditions, so their violation
does not necessarily imply indeterminacy. There can still exist a unique equilibrium even
when these conditions are not met. But what happens to the dynamics of yt when there
is a genuine multiplicity? The dynamics of yt is indeterminate during these periods, and
it therefore ceases to convey any information about the underlying fundamental, except
that the decisive agent does not have a dominant strategy. Meanwhile, the dynamics for zt
continues independently, and in the absence of learning, lemma 1 implies that the common
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belief about zt becomes more diffuse over time. Eventually, by convexity contraction,
there exists a unique equilibrium again and the learning resumes. Hysteresis results
obtained earlier go through during this phase. The relative lengths of indeterminacy
versus uniqueness phases clearly depend on the speed of yt relative to that of belief
evolution. If yt moves very quickly, then agents quickly learn about the fundamental, and
the common belief becomes concentrated rapidly, and multiplicity re-emerges sooner.
6 Cycle and welfare implications
A key positive implication of the model is that yt can perpetually cycle in a unique
strategic equilibrium, even in the absence of any actual change in the fundamental zt.
Holding zt fixed, the cycle’s peak-to-trough length is of the same order of magnitude as
θ, due to the maximum hysteresis established by proposition 2. This unique cycle result
stands in contrast with limit cycles in many dynamic macroeconomic models, where
there is usually an infinite number of equilibrium paths. In this model, cycle is not just
a possibility, but is the only well-defined equilibrium outcome.
Another defining feature of the model is that the equilibrium cycle gives rise to
a stationary probability distribution over the sets of states Y and regimes, computable
using the transition probabilities. Thus, the model goes beyond being a caricature of
fluctuations (e.g. by using multiple equilibria as an analogy), and explicitly characterizes
fluctuations in terms of a unique well-defined outcome represented by an equilibrium
distribution. The equilibrium distribution also allows a quantitative assessment of the
average time spent in each state, and offers quantitative predictions that can be fitted to
data and potentially rejected in empirical exercises.
The normative implications of the model can also be drawn from the equilibrium
distribution, and can give novel insights not available from traditional methods. For
example, the conventional macroeconomic theory explains business cycles as arising from
shocks being propagated by some mechanism, and roles of stabilization policy is how
to optimally offset these shocks. Here, fluctuations in yt are inevitable, driven by belief
hysteresis and persistent phases of high and low optimism. When ‘thinking cyclically’,
the policy’s objective is not to stabilize yt around some fixed level or trend, an impossible
task, but in obtaining the second best outcome by influencing the long-term stationary
distribution such that the economy spends most of its time, on average, in the active
states (high yt). Influencing transition probabilities in this way can raise welfare, even if
there remains a cycle.
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High regime
Low regime
yt yt + 1yt   1 y1y0
bh
bl
1      bh
1      bl
Figure 6: Cycle on a loop with two irreversible transit points.
6.1 Stationary distribution
To focus on the intrinsic fluctuations within the model, we abstract from the influence
of aggregate cost shock and consider the case where the random realization of z∗t is
repeatedly equal to its expected value, a constant. In this simple case of ex post fixed
z∗t (though perceived to be random ex ante), the regime switching points are fixed, and
yt is effectively a discrete-time birth-and-death process on a fixed closed-loop, with two
irreversible regime transit points, as depicted in figure 6. Denote the regime-switching
states from low to high by y0 and high to low by y1, where z∗t < y
0 < y1 < z∗t + θ, and
the cycle length y1 − y0 is no smaller than θ − 2ε as implied by proposition 2.
Denote the long-run or equilibrium probability of being in the 2-tuple state {y,
high regime} by µh (y) and in {y, low regime} by µl (y). Transition probabilities between
any pair of 2-tuple state are known and are illustrated in figure 6. Stacking the equi-
librium probabilities to define µs = [µh(0), ..., µh(N), µl(0), ..., µl(N)]
′, and denoting the
corresponding transition matrix by P , the equilibrium distribution µs is the nonnegative
solution to the stationarity condition13
Pµs = µs. (6.1)
Although a general explicit solution to this linear system is not tractable, the fact that
P defines an irreducible ergodic Markov chain means that µs can also be obtained from
any column of limn→∞ P n.
The stationary distribution is a natural dynamic equilibrium concept in the presence
of perpetual fluctuations, against which welfare can be evaluated. The social welfare
function is defined as the sum of individual’s value function in equation 3.2. When
13An equivalent equilibrium distribution condition is a linear system of full balance conditions (see
Kelly (2011)). Note that the process here is not time-reversible, and the detailed balance conditions do
not hold in this case.
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Figure 7: Numerical simulation results
the aggregate cost parameter zt is fixed, social welfare is a function of yt only through
the utility function u(yt). In business cycle application, a monotone increasing u(yt) is a
sensible assumption, as higher states yt represent higher aggregate activity. Social welfare
in this case will depend on the average time spent in higher states relative to lower states,
which is a complicated function of the underlying birth and death parameters.
6.2 Simulation
It is straightforward to solve for the stationary distribution numerically. Consider the
following configuration:
• Utility function: u(y) = log(y)
• State space parameters: N = 70, y0 = 20, and y1 = 50
• Birth and death rates: bh = 0.45, bl = 0.3, and δ = 0.2
Under these set of parameters where bh < 1−δ−bl, the cycle has a gradual build-up period
in high regime followed by a more abrupt correction in low regime, similar to a typical
business cycle or a bubble phenomenon. A random draw of yt under this configuration
is shown in figure 7a, which also plots the corresponding regime (1 means high regime,
and -1 low regime). The time-series are visually not very different from typical detrended
macro variables, and a simple autoregressive model also fits the series well. However,
mistaking the series as a single-regime process will result in incorrect long-run prediction
(a steady state rather than a stationary distribution) as well as suboptimal short-run
forecast which is regime-dependent.
The empirical distribution of the realized time-series is depicted in figure 7b. In the
long-run, the empirical distribution converges to the stationary distribution, which can be
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Figure 8: Welfare implications of comparative statics
computed by first deriving µs as discussed previously, and summing probabilities across
regimes to obtain µ(y) = µh(y) + µl(y) for y = 0, 1, ..., 70. The stationary distribution
is shown in figure 7b, which is non-symmetric and is skewed to the right. With a slow
buildup and a sharp correction, the economy ends up spending more time in lower states
than in higher states. It follows from the model’s symmetry and an increasing utility
function, that social welfare is lower than the conjugate case of bh > 1− δ− bl, where the
correction phase is more gradual than the boom. The relative cycle speeds in different
regimes therefore have non-trivial welfare implications.
Influencing the parameters bh and bl via policy can potentially raise social welfare.
All policy considered here is assumed to take a rule-based form, namely the policy function
(of state and regime) remains fixed throughout. For example, policy that leads to a
generalized increase in the birth rates should intuitively raise the time spent in higher
states. Simulation confirms that social welfare is increasing in both bh and bl, as shown
in figure 8a, which plots the utility surface as a function of bh and bl over the parametric
range where a cycle is well-defined. What is perhaps less intuitively obvious, is that
raising the high-regime birth rate bh is subject to diminishing marginal utility, whereas
the opposite is true for the low-regime birth rate bl. The reason for this asymmetry is
that, a higher bh precipitates a regime switch, reducing time spent in high states and
introducing an offsetting drag on welfare. On the other hand, a higher bl merely lowers
the downward speed and lessens the severity of the low regime. On balance, this implies
that the economy can approach the unconstrained optimal point as bl approaches the
maximum level, even if bh remains at moderate levels. The policy implication is consistent
with the conventional pragmatic wisdom that a policy stimulus should be implemented
‘counter-cyclically’.
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In practice, policy may be more targeted, designed to influence the transition rates
at only certain states. In figure 8b, we plot the additional utility resulting from a state-
specific increase in bh (high-regime intervention) and bl (low-regime intervention) by 0.05,
applied at each different state y.14 For targeted policy, the marginal benefit is largest
when the intervention takes place after the economy has already bottomed out, and the
regime has just switched to high. Implementing the targeted policy too late in the high
regime, i.e. when y has already risen for some time, is however counterproductive. A
targeted policy in low regime raises welfare for a larger set of states, and is most beneficial
when the bubble has just burst and the regime has just switched to low. The additional
welfare gained is however more limited. Thus, for targeted policy, the optimal plan is
to act early; in high regime to speed up the recovery, and in low regime to delay the
plunge. Acting too late in a high regime will only quicken a regime switch, which can
lower welfare. Acting late in a low regime will delay a welfare-enhancing regime switch.
This optimal plan is reminiscent of the policy ‘front-loading’ wisdom.
6.3 On estimation
When the parameters are unknown, how might they be estimated from the data? Unfor-
tunately, many existing empirical models differ in important ways from our model and
are not applicable. The model’s structure is distinct from the Markov regime-switching
model introduced in Hamilton (1989), since here the probability of a regime switch does
not just depend on the existing regime, but also on the state yt and the aggregate cost
zt. Our model places more restrictions on the probabilistic structure of a regime switch,
and while there is still uncertainty about the precise timing of a switch, it is certainly not
an event that can take place in any period with an equal probability. Our model, while
similar in spirit, is also different from threshold models, since thresholds in our model are
history dependent as well as time-irreversible.
Several empirical strategies can however be readily outlined. Because the model
predicts conditional distribution of yt, the maximum likelihood method can certainly be
applied, and a regime-specific likelihood function consistent with the transition prob-
abilities of the relevant birth-and-death process can be written down. The stochastic
evolution of aggregate cost zt needs to be treated as a latent variable, necessitating a state
space estimation. Inference about zt helps restrict the set of possible regime switching
points and the likelihood, relevant for forecasting exercises. An alternative approach is
to minimize the difference between the conditional stationary distribution and observed
empirical distribution, summarized as some metric, to obtain parameter estimates.
14The theoretical model assumes that bh and bl are constant across states, and thus this exercise is
only an approximation. However, the assumption is not indispensable, and some generalization follows
immediately. For example if bh and bl depends on the state, but the difference bh − bl is still fixed, then
the cost function remains the same as before, and all formal results follow.
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7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a theory of endogenous cycle based on a repeated game with strategic
complementarity under incomplete information and learning that exhibits strong hystere-
sis in equilibrium. In booms, it is difficult to shake off optimism, as a regime continuation
sends a public signal that reaffirms and adds to confidence, outweighing the impact of
private signals whose aggregate is not observed. Similarly in recessions, as long as there
is no clear sign of a recovery, pessimism is the only rational belief to hold in equilibrium,
resulting in protracted contraction. Put together, the economy cycles perpetually between
the two regimes, even without any actual shocks to fundamentals.
The main building blocks of the theory, including strategic complementarity, the
cost heterogeneity structure, Bayesian learning and the global game framework, have all
been extensively explored in various literature. The equilibrium cycle therefore derives
from ideas already familiar in economics, the combined strength of which ensure that the
resulting cycle result is free from typical criticisms that have kept models with cycles at the
fringe of macroeconomics. Despite its simplicity, the model delivers welfare implications
and quantitative predictions that can potentially be evaluated empirically.
The theory of endogenous cycle is perhaps best thought of as complementary
to the prevailing shock-and-propagation view, and there are benefits to allowing both
mechanisms to coexist in one general model. If the business cycles were in fact driven
by both an endogenous cycle mechanism and amplified exogenous shocks, a traditional
macroeconomic model would suffer from a misspecification problem, compromising the
ability to evaluate the impulse-response of exogenous shocks. On the other hand, any
doubt about the role of an endogenous fluctuation mechanism can only be proved or
disproved in a model nesting both endogenous cycle and shock propagation mechanisms.
But without any model of endogenous fluctuations, economic theory is ultimately void
of an explanation for fluctuations phenomena.
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Appendix
Proof to claim 1
Proof. Suppose that in period t, the unique equilibrium is characterised by maximum
delay, namely i∗t = yt − θ, i..e. from the equilibrium condition 3.5,
H¯t (yt − θ) =
∫ supZt
z=yt−θ
ht (z) dz = 1
Since ht must have no vacuum, it follows that this condition holds if and only if
inf Zt ≥ yt − θ = i∗t .
Thus, from equation 3.7, h˜t = ht and Z˜t ≡ [max {yt − θ, inf Zt} , supZt] = Zt, and there
is no learning update.
Proof to lemma 1
Proof. Note that by viewing z∗t as a random walk, we can write
z∗t+1 = z
∗
t +X
where X is a uniformly distributed random variable over [−ε, ε] . Thus ht+1 is a mean-
preserving spread of ht. The lemma then follows from a well-known fact that the notion
of a mean-preserving spread is equivalent to that of second-order stochastic dominance
(see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)).
Proof to claim 2
Proof. Suppose that ht is unimodal. The aim is to show directly that h
′
t+1 (z
∗) changes
sign at most only once as z∗ increases. Differentiating equation 3.10 gives
h′t+1 (z
∗) =

1
2ε
ht (z
∗ + ε) for z∗ ∈ [inf Zt − ε, inf Zt + ε]
1
2ε
[ht (z
∗ + ε)− ht (z∗ − ε)] for z∗ ∈ [inf Zt + ε, supZt − ε]
− 1
2ε
ht (z
∗ − ε) for z∗ ∈ [supZt − ε, supZt + ε]
. (.1)
The sign of h′t+1 (z
∗) is only ambiguous for z∗ ∈ [inf Zt + ε, supZt − ε]. Given that ht (z∗)
is unimodal, ht (z
∗ + ε) − ht (z∗ − ε) changes sign at most only once and the claim is
proved.
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Proof to lemma 2
Proof. Under a pure transition, we have
H¯t+1 (i)− H¯t (i) =
∫ supZt+ε
z=i
ht+1 (z) dz −
∫ supZt
z=i
ht (z) dz
=
1
2ε
∫ supZt+ε
z=i
[∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
ht (z
′) dz′
]
dz −
∫ supZt
z=i
ht (z) dz.
The double integral on the right hand side is merely a weighted sum, and can be expanded
by computing an appropriate weight for each term. Doing so gives
H¯t+1 (i)− H¯t (i) =
∫ supZt
z=i+ε
ht (z) dz +
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
(
z − i+ ε
2ε
)
ht (z) dz
−
∫ supZt
z=i
ht (z) dz
=
∫ supZt
z=i
ht (z) dz −
∫ i+ε
z=i
ht (z) dz +
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
(
z − i+ ε
2ε
)
ht (z) dz
−
∫ supZt
z=i
ht (z) dz
=
∫ i
z=i−ε
(
z − i+ ε
2ε
)
ht (z) dz −
∫ i+ε
z=i
(
i+ ε− z
2ε
)
ht (z) dz. (.2)
Notice that the linear weight on each term of the R.H.S of equation .2 is completely
symmetric around i. Thus, it is possible to collect terms with the same weight, and
rewrite equation .2 as
H¯t+1 (i)− H¯t (i) =
∫ ε
z=0
(
ε− z
2ε
)
[ht (i− z)− h (i+ z)] dz. (.3)
Any crossing point ict between H¯t+1 and H¯t must solve H¯t+1 (i
c
t)− H¯t (ict) = 0, thus
setting equation .3 to zero, a crossing point ict must be a solution to∫ ε
z=0
(
ε− z
2ε
)
[ht (i
c
t − z)− h (ict + z)] dz = 0. (.4)
It follows immediately from equation .4 that ht (i
c
t − z) − h (ict + z) cannot be positive
or negative for all z ∈ [0, ε]. Equivalently put, ht cannot be strictly monotonic on
[ict − ε, ict + ε], and hence we have ict ∈ [imt − ε, imt + ε] since the mode defines the threshold
for which ht changes from being increasing to being decreasing. This proves part (1).
Unimodality of ht only implies that, for any fixed positive z, ht (i− z) − h (i+ z)
changes sign from negative to positive at most only once as i increases. If, in addition,
ht is concave on [i
m
t − 2ε, imt + 2ε], then for i ∈ [imt − ε, imt + ε] and z ∈ [0, ε], ht (i− z)−
h (i+ z) must be increasing in i, and the R.H.S of equation .3 must also be increasing in
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i, and there is a unique solution to equation .4, proving part (2).
Proof to claim 3
Proof. Since ht+1 > ht on [inf Zt+1, inf Zt]∪ [supZt, supZt+1], if ht+1 crosses ht twice then
Zt+1 is a union of three ordered disjoint subintervals, Z
A
t+1, Z
B
t+1 and Z
C
t+1 (ordered from
low to high) such that ht+1 (z) < ht (z) if and only if z ∈ ZBt+1. On ZAt+1, ht+1 ≥ ht and
hence H¯t (z) − H¯t+1 (z) is positive and rises with z (recalling that the derivative of H¯t
is −ht). In other words, as z ∈ ZAt+1 rises, H¯t and H¯t+1 diverge and hence cannot cross
on ZAt+1. Similarly as z ∈ ZCt+1 decreases, H¯t and H¯t+1 diverge and thus there cannot be
a crossing on ZCt+1. It follows that on Z
B
t+1, we have H¯t+1
(
inf ZBt+1
)
< H¯t
(
inf ZBt+1
)
and
H¯t+1
(
supZBt+1
)
> H¯t
(
supZBt+1
)
, and by continuity of H¯t and H¯t+1 there must be at least
one crossing on ZBt+1 (this fact also follows from lemma 1). But on Z
B
t+1, ht+1 < ht so
that H¯t+1 − H¯t contracts, and hence there is at most one crossing on ZBt+1 and the claim
follows.
Proof to claim 4
Proof. Supposing there is no regime switch at date t, differentiating equation 3.7 gives
h˜′t (z
∗) =
 1∫ supZt
z=max{i∗t ,inf Zt} ht (z) dz
h′t (z∗)
so that the signs of h′t and h˜
′
t are identical and the claim follows. If there is a regime
switch at date t, then one differentiates equation 3.8 and the same argument applies.
Proof to lemma 3
Proof. Following claim 1, we could ignore the case of initial maximum delay. Let the
belief at time t, H¯t, be fixed. When there is a truncation at the end of period t, followed
by a transition mapping at the beginning of period t+ 1, denote the new belief by H¯1t+1
(with primitive density h1t+1 on set Z
1
t+1). On other hand, if there is no truncation but
a transition only, then let the new belief be given by H¯2t+1 (h
2
t+1). In terms of these
notations, a truncation leads to greater delay, ceteris paribus, if i∗t+1 is smaller under
belief H¯1t+1 than under H¯
2
t+1 while the state is kept unchanged, yt+1 = yt. Thus, in view
of the equilibrium condition 3.5 and on the assumption that equilibrium is always unique,
there is a greater delay under truncation if H¯1t+1 (i) > H¯
2
t+1 (i) for all i ∈ [yt+1 − θ, yt+1]
(namely the primitive distribution underlying H¯1t+1 first-order stochastically dominates
that of H¯2t+1). Following claim 5, h˜t first-order stochastically dominates ht if there is a
truncation, hence a sufficient condition for H¯1t+1 > H¯
2
t+1 is that the shock transition rule
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preserves the first-order stochastic dominance property. For H¯1t+1(i) > H¯
2
t+1(i) to hold
for all i, we must have for each i∫ supZt+1
z=i
h1t+1 (z) dz >
∫ supZt+1
z=i
h2t+1 (z) dz∫ supZt+1
z=i
[
1
2ε
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
h˜t (z
′) dz′
]
dz >
∫ supZt+1
z=i
[
1
2ε
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
ht (z
′) dz′
]
dz.
Using equation 3.7, the inequality becomes∫ supZt+1
z=i
[
C
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
h#t (z
′) dz′
]
dz >
∫ supZt+1
z=i
[∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
ht (z
′) dz′
]
dz (.5)
where C > 1 is the truncation normalisation factor, and
h#t (z) ≡
{
ht (z) for all z ∈ [i∗t , supZt]
0 otherwise.
Note immediately that, for z = supZt+1 we have
C
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
h#t (z
′) dz′ =
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
ht (z
′) dz′ = 0,
whereas for z ≤ i∗t − ε, we have
C
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
h#t (z
′) dz′ = 0 ≤
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
ht (z
′) dz′.
It follows then that a sufficient condition for inequality .5 to hold is that C
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε h
#
t (z
′) dz′
crosses
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε ht (z
′) dz′ only once on (i∗t − ε, supZt+1). To check if this single-crossing
condition is satisfied, first let z0 be an arbitrary crossing point, i.e. any solution to
C
∫ z0+ε
z′=z0−ε
h#t (z
′) dz′ =
∫ z0+ε
z′=z0−ε
ht (z
′) dz′.
Since C > 1, it trivially follows that i∗t > z
0− ε (and hence a small change in z0 does not
affect the lower integration limit on the left hand side). Differentiate
C
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
h#t (z
′) dz′ −
∫ z+ε
z′=z−ε
ht (z
′) dz′
locally around z0 to get
Cht
(
z0 + ε
)− ht (z0 + ε)+ ht (z0 − ε) = (C − 1)ht (z0 + ε)+ ht (z0 − ε)
> 0
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and hence the single crossing condition is satisfied, and the result follows.
Proof to claim 6
Proof. Let us consider only left truncations (i.e. when the regime is initially high). By
definition,
imt+1 ≡ arg max
i
ht+1 (i)
= arg max
i
1
2ε
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
h˜t (z) dz
= arg max
i
1
2ε
∫ i+ε
z=max{i∗t ,i−ε,}
ht (z)
C
dz
= arg max
i
∫ i+ε
z=max{i∗t ,i−ε}
ht (z) dz
where C is a constant as given in equation 3.7. Clearly, we either have
imt+1 = arg max
i
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
ht (z) dz
in which case a truncation does not change the mode (from that yielded under a pure
transition), or
imt+1 = arg max
i
∫ i+ε
z=i∗t
ht (z) dz
> arg max
i
∫ i+ε
z=i−ε
ht (z) dz
and the claim follows.
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